Self-control problems and the folk theorem

被引:3
|
作者
Bernergard, Axel [1 ]
机构
[1] Sodertorn Univ, Dept Social Sci, SE-14189 Huddinge, Sweden
关键词
Folk theorem; Present-biased; Discounting; Hyperbolic; REPEATED GAMES; EQUILIBRIUM; CONSUMPTION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2019.05.004
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper generalizes the basic complete information pure-action folk theorem such that it applies when discounting is present-biased and the discount factor between two successive periods increases with the waiting time until the periods are reached. We distinguish between time-consistent decision makers who maximize their initial preferences and time-inconsistent decision makers who maximize their current preferences, and our folk theorem holds for both types. Since discount functions are not assumed to have any specific functional form, decision makers are said to be patient if the sum of the discount factors for all periods is large. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:332 / 347
页数:16
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