Efficient patent pools

被引：260
|
作者：
Lerner, J
Tirole, J
机构：
[1] Harvard Univ, Grad Sch Business, Rock Ctr 214, Boston, MA 02163 USA
[2] Univ Toulouse, Inst Econ Ind, F-31000 Toulouse, France
[3] CNRS, URA 2036, CERAS, CNRS,UMR 5604,GREMAQ, Paris, France
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2004年 / 94卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1257/0002828041464641
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The paper builds a tractable model of patent pools, agreements among patent owners to license sets of their patents. It provides a necessary and sufficient condition for patent pools to enhance welfare and shows that requiring pool members to be able to independently license patents matters if and only if the pool is otherwise welfare reducing. The paper allows patents to differ in importance, asymmetric blocking patterns, and licensors to also be licensees. We undertake some initial exploration of the impact of pools on innovation. The analysis has broader applicability than pools, being relevant to a number of co-marketing arrangements.
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页码：691 / 711
页数：21
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