EXIT, VOICE, AND COOPERATION: BARGAINING POWER IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND FEDERAL SYSTEMS

Literature on international organizations points to several potential sources of bargaining power: voice, exit, and exclusion. In some circumstances, a member state may be able to effectively voice objections to a change to an organization's institutions. In others, it may threaten to leave the organization if its demands are not met. Finally, member states may be able to force a laggard member state to accept unwanted change by threatening to exclude the laggard from the organization. Under what circumstances do these strategies provide bargaining leverage? Are these options available simultaneously or if one is available does that mean that the others are not? What implications does this have for international cooperation, and more broadly, the possible creation of a federal state? This article seeks to answer these questions using a formal model to examine the interaction between voice, specifically veto rights, exit, and exclusion in international organizations and federal states. The model has implications for European integration and can also help explain the conditions under which independent states give up sovereignty to form a stable federal union. Implications of the model are tested through a case study of EU integration in the 1970s and 1980s.