International Organizations, Strategy, and Crisis Bargaining

We analyze a game-theoretic model of crisis bargaining in which a challenger state can consult an international organization whose decisions can affect its costs for war. We demonstrate that, first, while multilateral opposition lowers the probability of war by coordinating international opposition and increasing the costs of fighting multilateral support can increase the probability of war by coordinating support and lowering those costs. Second, the aggregate effect of 10 involvement on the probability of war is conditional on the strategic decisions of challengers to initially consult the organization, implying that any empirical analysis of the pacific effects of IOs should take this selection process seriously. Finally, we provide a more nuanced explanation for why states seek multilateral support and fail; rather than a lack of material power to influence 10 decisions, it is a strategic incentive to take greater risks of opposition in order to garner the benefits multilateral support. This allows us to address broader debates about the role of international institutions by showing that IOs are neither ineffectual nor universally a force for peace.