Firm Performance and Managerial Succession in Family Managed Firms

被引:48
|
作者
Hillier, David [2 ]
McColgan, Patrick [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Strathclyde, Dept Accounting & Finance, Glasgow G4 0LN, Lanark, Scotland
[2] Univ Leeds, Sch Business, Leeds LS2 9JT, W Yorkshire, England
关键词
CEO turnover; corporate restructuring; family managed firms; firm performance; CEO TURNOVER; VOTING-RIGHTS; OWNERSHIP; MARKET; EVENT;
D O I
10.1111/j.1468-5957.2009.02138.x
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper investigates whether the family status of a company's top officer affects managerial replacement decisions. We report evidence that family-managed companies are characterized by higher levels of board control and potentially weak internal governance systems. Family CEOs are less likely than non-family CEOs to depart their position following poor performance. Stock prices react favorably and operating performance improves when companies announce the departure of a family CEO. Overall, our evidence suggests that shareholders benefit when a powerful CEO leaves their position in the company.
引用
收藏
页码:461 / 484
页数:24
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