The dual scale model of weighing reasons

被引:9
|
作者
Tucker, Chris [1 ]
机构
[1] William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187 USA
来源
NOUS | 2022年 / 56卷 / 02期
关键词
D O I
10.1111/nous.12361
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The metaphor of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double-pan balance) scale. The reasons for phi go in one pan and the reasons for similar to phi go in the other. The relative weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two pans of the scale, determine the deontic status of phi. This model is simple and intuitive, but it cannot capture what it is to weigh reasons correctly. A reason pushes the phi pan down toward permissibility (has justifying weight) only insofar as it pushes the similar to phi pan up toward impermissibility (has requiring weight). Thus, Single Scale is committed to Single Proportion (first pass): all reasons have the same proportion of justifying and requiring weight. Many normative theories reject Single Proportion, and they are not thereby confused about how to weigh reasons. One can be mistaken about the weight of a reason without being confused about how reasons are to be weighed. Single Scale is problematic, not because it appeals to the image of a scale, but because it appeals to the image of a single scale. We need two scales to capture what it is to weigh reasons correctly.
引用
收藏
页码:366 / 392
页数:27
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