Pricing to preclude sabotage in regulated industries

被引：0
|
作者：
Bose, Arup [1 ]
Pal, Debashis [2 ]
Sappington, David E. M. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Indian Stat Inst, Theoret Stat & Math Unit, Kolkata 700108, India
[2] Univ Cincinnati, Dept Econ, Cincinnati, OH 45221 USA
[3] Univ Florida, Dept Econ, POB 117140, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2017年 / 51卷
关键词：
Sabotage; Raising rivals' costs; Wholesale and retail price regulation; INCENTIVES; COMPETITION; DISCRIMINATION; LADDER;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.01.004
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We characterize the optimal access price and retail price for a vertically-integrated incumbent supplier (V) that faces limited competition from a new entrant in the retail sector. The optimal prices provide V with a relatively high wholesale profit margin and a relatively low retail profit margin. Consequently, V has no incentive to raise the costs of its retail rival. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：162 / 184
页数：23
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