机构:
Tel Aviv Univ, Coller Sch Management, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
Univ Warwick, Dept Econ, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, EnglandTel Aviv Univ, Coller Sch Management, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
Glazer, Jacob
[1
,2
]
Rubinstein, Ariel
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Tel Aviv Univ, Sch Econ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
NYU, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10012 USATel Aviv Univ, Coller Sch Management, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
Rubinstein, Ariel
[3
,4
]
机构:
[1] Tel Aviv Univ, Coller Sch Management, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
[2] Univ Warwick, Dept Econ, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England
[3] Tel Aviv Univ, Sch Econ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel
problem solver;
Gale-Ryser algorithm;
coordination games;
artificial intelligence;
D O I:
10.1287/mnsc.2018.3078
中图分类号:
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号:
12 ;
1201 ;
1202 ;
120202 ;
摘要:
A "problem solver" (PS) is an agent who when interacting with other agents does not "put himself in their shoes" but rather chooses a best response to a uniform distribution over all possible configurations consistent with the information he receives about the other agents' moves. We demonstrate the special features of a PS by analyzing a modified coordination game. In the first stage, each of the other participants-who are treated as conventional players-chooses a location. The PS then receives some partial information about their moves and chooses his location. The PS wishes to coordinate with any one of the conventional players and they wish to coordinate with him but not with each other. Equilibria are characterized and shown to have different properties than those of Nash equilibria when the PS is treated as a conventional player.