Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions

被引：2
|
作者：
Monteiro, Paulo Klinger [1 ]
机构：
[1] FGV EPGE, BR-22250900 Rio De Janeiro, Brazil
来源：
ECONOMIC THEORY | 2009年 / 40卷 / 03期
关键词：
Independent private values; Abstract types; Revenue equivalence;
D O I：
10.1007/s00199-008-0386-0
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
A large body of the mechanism design literature relies on convexity assumptions on the set of types (that is, on the domain of the mechanism). In this note I show that, at least for auction mechanisms with independent signals, it is always possible to extend incentive compatible mechanisms to incentive compatible mechanisms defined on any larger set of types.
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页码：497 / 507
页数：11
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