TESTING PASSIVE VERSUS SYMMETRIC BELIEFS IN CONTRACTING WITH EXTERNALITIES

被引：3
|
作者：
Zhang, Daiqiang [1 ]
机构：
[1] SUNY Albany, Dept Econ, Albany, NY 12222 USA
来源：
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2021年 / 62卷 / 02期
关键词：
NONPARAMETRIC-ESTIMATION; VERTICAL INTEGRATION; COMPETITION; PRICES; TRANSPARENCY; INCENTIVES; IDENTIFICATION; INNOVATION; INFERENCE; SELECTION;
D O I：
10.1111/iere.12492
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This article provides identification and estimation methods for a model of contracting with externalities and imperfect information. In this model, one principal offers a contract of trade quantity to each of multiple agents, and the negotiated payment for each agent is determined via Nash bargaining. Beliefs matter due to the privacy of bilateral contracting and the externalities from the dependence of each agent's payoff on all agents' trade quantities. We provide a test to determine whether passive or symmetric beliefs fit a given data set better. The empirical results suggest the relevance of adopting the correct beliefs for policy evaluations.
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页码：723 / 767
页数：45
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