Classified boards are the focus of recent shareholder activism aimed at improving U.S. corporate governance. Although critics argue that classified boards reduce directors' effectiveness, proponents counter that they enhance corporate stability, board independence, and long-term strategic risk taking. Based on hand-collected data, this study found that stability was similar for both classified and nonclassified boards and that continuity rates for independent directors were comparable for both categories. The study found as well that companies with classified boards invested less in R&D and other company-specific capital assets. These findings were also true for companies with relatively complex operations that are often considered most likely to benefit from classified boards.
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UNE Business School, University of New England, Armidale,NSW,2351, AustraliaUNE Business School, University of New England, Armidale,NSW,2351, Australia
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Oregon State Univ, Coll Business, 443 Austin Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331 USAOregon State Univ, Coll Business, 443 Austin Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331 USA
Moore, Jared A.
Suh, SangHyun.
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Univ Massachusetts Lowell, Manning Sch Business, 218 Pasteur Hall,One Univ Ave, Lowell, MA 01854 USAOregon State Univ, Coll Business, 443 Austin Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331 USA
Suh, SangHyun.
Werner, Edward M.
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Rutgers State Univ, Sch Business, 215 Business & Sci Bldg,227 Penn St, Camden, NJ 08102 USAOregon State Univ, Coll Business, 443 Austin Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331 USA