The Trio Presidency and the Efficiency of Council Decision-Making: An Empirical Study

被引:11
|
作者
van Gruisen, Philippe [1 ]
机构
[1] Leiden Univ, Dept Econ, Leiden, Netherlands
关键词
Council of the European Union; Decision-making; Agenda-setting; Legislative duration; EUROPEAN-UNION; POWER; SPEED;
D O I
10.1111/jcms.12841
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Does the trio presidency system enhance efficiency in EU legislative decision-making? Since 2007, fixed groups of three Member States have been required to set a joint 18-month agenda, with each Member State taking 6-month turns at the presidency. To date, however, there has been no empirical evidence that either confirms or refutes the notion that this system is efficient. In a study of the duration of Council decision-making on 1,927 legislative proposals for the 2000-12 period, we obtain empirical support for the hypothesis that a common agenda leads to a significant decrease in the amount of time needed to reach a first agreement on regulations, directives and decisions. In addition, we show that the requirement to pre-negotiate the agenda helps to moderate the effect of political conflict on the speed of decision-making, thereby offering support to the recent decision to proceed with the trio presidency system until at least 2030.
引用
收藏
页码:692 / 709
页数:18
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