Price Discrimination in Dynamic Cournot Competition

被引：2
|
作者：
Wei-li Zhang [1 ]
Song, Qi-Qing [1 ]
Jiang, Yi-Rong [1 ]
机构：
[1] Guilin Univ Technol, Coll Sci, Guilin 541004, Peoples R China
来源：
DISCRETE DYNAMICS IN NATURE AND SOCIETY | 2019年 / 2019卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
DUOPOLY GAME; OLIGOPOLY;
D O I：
10.1155/2019/9231582
中图分类号：
O1 [数学];
学科分类号：
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要：
This paper introduces a new Cournot duopoly game and gives an applied study for price discrimination in a market by dynamic methods. One of two oligopolies has two different prices for a homogeneous product, while the other charges one kind of price. It is found that there is only one stable equilibrium for the discrete dynamic system, and a corresponding stable condition is given. Using a discriminative price is not always beneficial to a firm in equilibrium. If both oligopolies carry out price discrimination, the market's average price is lower than when only one oligopoly does it. The results are verified by numerical simulations.
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页数：8
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