Shareholder Value Implications of Compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code

被引:13
|
作者
Kaspereit, Thomas [1 ]
Lopatta, Kerstin [1 ]
Onnen, Dennis [1 ]
机构
[1] Carl von Ossietzky Univ Oldenburg, Accounting & Corp Governance, Ammerlander Heerstr 114-118, D-26111 Oldenburg, Germany
关键词
VALUE-RELEVANCE; PANEL-DATA; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; AGENCY COSTS; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; EARNINGS; EFFICIENCY; VALUATION; DIVERSITY;
D O I
10.1002/mde.2750
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study contributes to the ongoing discussion of the German Corporate Governance Code (GCGC) of the Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (Government Commission), which should enhance the confidence of national and international investors. We apply the Feltham and Ohlson () valuation model to a panel dataset of 421 German CDAX firms over the period 2002-2012 and find a positive effect of the level of compliance with the GCGC on the market value of firms. We conclude that the recommendations of the GCGC reflect corporate governance that satisfies investors' needs, as the capital markets perceive them. Our results are in favor of the efforts of the Government Commission, which have attracted criticism from both theorists and practitioners both in the past and at present. From the perspective of managerial and decision economics, the empirical results of this study suggest that executives should follow as many recommendations of the GCGC as possible. Copyright (C) 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
引用
收藏
页码:166 / 177
页数:12
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