Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets

被引：3

作者：

Haake, Claus-Jochen ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Bielefeld, IMW, D-33501 Bielefeld, Germany

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 2009年 / 57卷 / 02期

关键词：

Support result; Object division market; Kalai-Smorodinsky solution; NASH PROGRAM; IMPLEMENTATION;

D O I：

10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.09.004

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Strategic interaction determines an allocation of objects, so that evaluation with individual utilities constitute the pay-offs in the derived games. These allocations of objects are obtained through individual demand in a specific market for objects. For the first support result, games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium and equilibrium payoffs equal the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution of the underlying bargaining problem. The second result uses subgame perfect equilibria of a game in extensive form. Again, payoffs in any subgame perfect equilibrium coincide with the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：177 / 187

页数：11