Cost reduction, competitive pressure and firms' optimal R&D strategies in a duopolistic industry

被引：6
|
作者：
Campisi, D [1 ]
Mancuso, P [1 ]
Nastasi, A [1 ]
机构：
[1] UNIV ROMA TOR VERGATA,DEPT PROD SYST & COMP SCI,I-00133 ROME,ITALY
来源：
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1997年 / 12卷 / 02期
关键词：
noncooperative R&D; dynamic noncooperative feedback game; stock of technological knowledge; intra-industry spillovers; extra-industry R&D;
D O I：
10.1023/A:1007762402056
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper deals with a duopolistic industry where firms are engaged in cost-reducing R&D activity in order to maximize their market shares. Firms' R&D competition is characterized as a dynamic noncooperative feedback game where the optimal strategies are affected by the extra-industry R&D activity and the degree of intra-industry spillovers. Numerical simulations highlight the importance of the assumptions on the firms' absorptive capacity (to exploit external knowledge) in determining the optimal levels of firms R&D investments.
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页码：259 / 270
页数：12
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