WITTGENSTEIN'S PROBLEM OF RULE-FOLLOWING AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY STUDIES

被引：1
|
作者：
Ogleznev, Vitaly V. [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Russian Acad Sci, Siberian Branch, Inst Philosophy & Law, 8 Nikolaeva Str, Novosibirsk 630090, Russia
[2] St Petersburg State Univ, 7-9 Univ Skaya Emb, St Petersburg 199034, Russia
来源：
EPISTEMOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-EPISTEMOLOGIYA I FILOSOFIYA NAUKI | 2020年 / 57卷 / 03期
关键词：
rule-following; legal language; legal rule; analytical legal philosophy;
D O I：
10.5840/eps202057337
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
The article presents an analysis of K.A. Rodin's argument that after publishing of Peter Winch's book "The Idea of Social Science" (1958) the discussions of rule-following problem concerning to social epistemology and the methodology of social studies have not had tangible results. It is shown by the example of modern legal studies that this conclusion is not valid. On the contrary, Wittgenstein's problem of rule-following and the very idea of rule-shaped activity have proved to have a great importance for an analytical legal philosophy and turned into an independent subject of study.
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页码：34 / 39
页数：6
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