The Spontaneity of Understanding in Kant and some Neo-Kantianism

被引:3
|
作者
Boyle, Matthew [1 ]
机构
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Philosophy, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
来源
DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR PHILOSOPHIE | 2015年 / 63卷 / 04期
关键词
Kant; spontaneity; belief; cognitive agency;
D O I
10.1515/dzph-2015-0050
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Kant famously characterizes our human understanding as a "spontaneous" faculty, but what can this mean? I criticize some recent interpretations of Kant's claim and suggest that we can only understand what Kant means by "the spontaneity of understanding" if we recognize certain basic differences between how Kant conceived of cognition and how philosophers commonly think of it today. I go on to argue that Kant's conception of cognition represents an appealing alternative to the unsatisfying options that contemporary ways of thinking seem to force on us.
引用
收藏
页码:705 / 726
页数:22
相关论文
共 50 条