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The unique equilibrium in a model of sales with costly advertising
被引：8
|作者：
Arnold, Michael A.
[1
]
Zhang, Lan
[2
]
机构：
[1] Univ Delaware, Alfred Lerner Coll Business & Econ, Dept Econ, Newark, DE 19806 USA
[2] Southwest Univ Finance & Econ, Res Inst Econ & Management, Chengdu, Peoples R China
关键词：
Advertising;
Sales;
Unique equilibrium;
Price dispersion;
INFORMATION GATEKEEPERS;
PRICE DISPERSION;
INTERNET;
MARKETS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2014.07.005
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We demonstrate that the Varian (1980) model of sales has a unique Nash equilibrium when firms incur costly advertising to compete for informed consumers. The equilibrium is symmetric. In particular, with costly advertising, the asymmetric equilibria highlighted by Baye et al. (1992) do not arise. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：457 / 460
页数：4
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