The top-trading cycles and chains solution for kidney exchange with immunosuppressants

被引：1

作者：

Heo, Eun Jeong ^{[1
]}

Hong, Sunghoon ^{[2
]}

Chun, Youngsub ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Dept Econ, Seoul, South Korea

[2] Univ Seoul, Dept Sci Taxat, 163 Seoulsiripdaero, Seoul 02504, South Korea

[3] Seoul Natl Univ, Dept Econ, Seoul, South Korea

来源：

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2022年 / 18卷 / 01期

基金：

新加坡国家研究基金会;

关键词：

immunosuppressant; kidney exchange; top-trading cycles and chains solution; top-trading cycles rule;

D O I：

10.1111/ijet.12298

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In kidney transplantation, immunosuppressants are being used to relax all immunological constraints, allowing patients to receive transplants from biologically incompatible donors. We propose an efficient way of using immunosuppressants in combination with a kidney exchange program. We introduce the top-trading cycles and chains solution, a modification of the top-trading cycles rule for the standard kidney exchange problem, and investigate its properties.

引用

页码：77 / 91

页数：15

共 50 条

[41] Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets
Feng, Di
Klaus, Bettina
Klijn, Flip
[J]. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 2024, 146 : 234 - 254
[42] Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
Paula Jaramillo
[J]. Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, 48 : 177 - 195
[43] On obviously strategy-proof implementation of fixed priority top trading cycles with outside options
Mandal, Pinaki
Roy, Souvik
[J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2022, 211
[44] Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
Jaramillo, Paula
[J]. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2017, 48 (01) : 177 - 195
[45] Donors in chains: psychosocial outcomes of kidney donors in paired exchange
Serur, David
Charlton, Marian
Lawton, Michelle
Sinacore, Joseph
Gordon-Elliot, Janna
[J]. PROGRESS IN TRANSPLANTATION, 2014, 24 (04) : 371 - 374
[46] Paired kidney exchange is not a solution to ABO incompatibility
Terasaki, PI
Gjertson, DW
Cecka, JM
[J]. TRANSPLANTATION, 1998, 65 (02) : 291 - 291
[47] Finding long chains in kidney exchange using the traveling salesman problem
Anderson, Ross
Ashlagi, Itai
Gamarnik, David
Roth, Alvin E.
[J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 2015, 112 (03) : 663 - 668
[48] Stable two-sided matching of slot allocation in airport collaborative decision making by top trading cycles mechanism
da Silva Souza, Marcio Augusto
Li, Weigang
Garcia, Reinaldo Crispiniano
[J]. CHINESE JOURNAL OF AERONAUTICS, 2018, 31 (03) : 534 - 545
[49] CHAINS OVER CYCLES ARE SELECTED BY COMPUTER SOFTWARE OPTIMIZATION IN THE KIDNEY PAIRED DONATION PROGRAM.
Stepkowski, Stanislaw
Fumo, David
Smith, Connie
Blair, Annette
Rees, Michael
Rees, Michael
[J]. HUMAN IMMUNOLOGY, 2015, 76 : 144 - 144
[50] Stable two-sided matching of slot allocation in airport collaborative decision making by top trading cycles mechanism
Marcio Augusto DA SILVA SOUZA
Weigang LI
Reinaldo Crispiniano GARCIA
[J]. Chinese Journal of Aeronautics, 2018, (03) : 534 - 545

← 1 2 3 4 5 →