Public enforcement of securities market rules: Resource-based evidence from the Securities and Exchange Commission

被引:7
|
作者
Lohse, Tim [1 ,2 ]
Pascalau, Razvan [3 ]
Thomann, Christian [4 ,5 ,6 ]
机构
[1] Berlin Sch Econ & Law, D-10315 Berlin, Germany
[2] Max Planck Inst Tax Law & Publ Finance, D-80539 Munich, Germany
[3] SUNY Coll Plattsburgh, Dept Econ & Finance, Plattsburgh, NY 12901 USA
[4] Royal Inst Technol KTH, CESIS, S-10044 Stockholm, Sweden
[5] Leibniz Univ Hannover, Ctr Risk & Insurance IVBL, D-30167 Hannover, Germany
[6] Minist Finance, S-10333 Stockholm, Sweden
关键词
Public enforcement; Securities laws; Compliance; Securities and Exchange Commission; Budget; NEW-YORK-CITY; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; INVESTOR PROTECTION; CRIME; POLICE; DETERRENCE; LAW; ECONOMICS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2014.06.010
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We empirically investigate whether increases in the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) budget have an effect on firms' compliance behavior with securities market rules. Our study uses a dataset on the SEC's resources and its enforcement actions over a period beginning shortly after the Second World War and ending in 2010. We find that increases in the SEC's resources both improve compliance and lead to an increased activity level of the SEC. The higher level of compliance is reflected by a decrease in the numbers of enforcement cases. The increased activity level is reflected by a surge in the number of investigations conducted by the SEC. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:197 / 212
页数:16
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