Price vs. quantity competition in a vertically related market

被引：47
|
作者：
Alipranti, Maria [1 ]
Milliou, Chrysovalantou [2 ]
Petrakis, Emmanuel [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Dusseldorf, DICE, Dusseldorf, Germany
[2] Athens Univ Econ & Business, Dept Int & European Econ Studies, Athens, Greece
[3] Univ Crete, Dept Econ, Rethimnon 74100, Greece
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2014年 / 124卷 / 01期
关键词：
Coumot; Bertrand; Vertical relations; Two-part tariffs; COURNOT EQUILIBRIA; BERTRAND; MANUFACTURERS; INTEGRATION; EFFICIENCY; INFERENCE; RETAILERS; CONTRACTS; DUOPOLY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper demonstrates that the standard conclusions regarding the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition are reversed in a vertically related market with upstream monopoly and trading via two-part tariffs. In such a market, downstream Cournot competition yields higher output, lower wholesale prices, lower final prices, higher consumers' surplus, and higher total welfare than Bertrand competition. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：122 / 126
页数：5
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