Attack Vulnerability of Power Systems Under an Equal Load Redistribution Model

被引:17
|
作者
Gulcu, Talha Cihad [1 ]
Chatziafratis, Vaggos [2 ]
Zhang, Yingrui [3 ]
Yagan, Osman [3 ]
机构
[1] TUBITAK Software Technol Res Inst, TR-06100 Ankara, Turkey
[2] Stanford Univ, Comp Sci Dept, Palo Alto, CA 94305 USA
[3] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Dept Elect & Comp Engn, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
Flow networks; cascading failures vulnerability; optimal attack strategies; CASCADING FAILURES;
D O I
10.1109/TNET.2018.2823325
中图分类号
TP3 [计算技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
This paper studies the vulnerability of flow networks against adversarial attacks. In particular, consider a power system (or, any system carrying a physical flow) consisting of N transmission lines with initial loads L-1,...,L-N and capacities C-1,..., C-N, respectively; the capacity' C-i defines the maximum flow allowed on line i. Under an equal load redistribution model, where load of failed lines is redistributed equally among all remaining lines, we study the optimization problem of finding the best k lines to attack so as to minimize the number of alive lines at the steady-state (i.e., when cascades stop). This is done to reveal the worst-case attack vulnerability of the system as well as to reveal its most vulnerable lines. We derive optimal attack strategies in several special cases of load-capacity' distributions that are practically relevant. We then consider a modified optimization problem where the adversary is also constrained by the total load (in addition to the number) of the initial attack set, and prove that this problem is NP-hard. Finally, we develop heuristic algorithms for selecting the attack set for both the original and modified problems. Through extensive simulations, we show that these heuristics outperform benchmark algorithms under a wide range of settings.
引用
收藏
页码:1306 / 1319
页数:14
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