Experimental tests of self-selection and screening in insurance decisions

A major characteristic of insurance markets is information asymmetry that may lead to phenomena such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Another aspect of markets with asymmetric information is self-selection, which refers to the pattern of choices that individuals with different personal characteristics make when facing a menu of contracts or options. To combat problems of asymmetric information, insurance firms can use screening. That is, they can offer the clients a menu of choices and infer their characteristics from their choices. This article reports the results of several studies that examined the degree to which people behave according to the notions of self-selection and screening. Subjects played the role of either insurance buyers or sellers. The results of these studies provide partial support for the hypothesis that subjects use self-selection and screening in insurance markets Our study also points at the importance of learning in experimental studies In one-stage experiments where subjects did not get feedback, screening was not detected. When multistage experiments were conducted; and the subjects learned from experience and were also taught the relevant theories, their decisions were more aligned with screening.