Majority voting with bribes does not eliminate voting cycles - Comment

被引：0
|
作者：
Tullock, G
Eller, K
机构：
来源：
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS | 1997年 / 9卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1177/0951692897009001012
中图分类号：
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号：
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要：
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页码：135 / 135
页数：1
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