Governance practices and agency cost in emerging market: Evidence from India

被引：7
|
作者：
Katti, Supriya [1 ]
Raithatha, Mehul [2 ]
机构：
[1] Indian Inst Technol Kanpur, Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, India
[2] Indian Inst Management Indore, Rau Pithampur Rd, Indore 453556, Madhya Pradesh, India
来源：
MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS | 2018年 / 39卷 / 06期
关键词：
FIRM PERFORMANCE EVIDENCE; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; BUSINESS GROUPS; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; BOARD INDEPENDENCE; GROUP AFFILIATION; DIRECTORS; COMPENSATION; CEO; REFORMS;
D O I：
10.1002/mde.2940
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In this study, we examine whether governance practices brings down agency cost. We find that board size, board attendance, and CEO duality are important governance characteristics that influence the agency cost. We also bring out systematic differences in governance practices of the business group affiliated firms and stand-alone firms. Larger board and proportion of independent director helps in reducing the agency cost for group affiliated firms supporting monitoring hypothesis. On the other hand, the governance structure of stand-alone firms supports commitment hypothesis where we observe that board busyness and CEO duality help in reducing the agency cost.
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页码：712 / 732
页数：21
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