Credit constraints and distress sales in rural India: Evidence from Kalahandi District, Orissa

The literature on the rural credit market in India (and elsewhere) has generally assumed that peasant farm households are rationed in their access to subsidized formal credit. Because of a lack of infrastructure and poor access to institutional credit, such farmers are exploited by means of an interlocked market connecting informal credit to the sale of paddy. The resulting gap, between the sale by a borrower of paddy at a predetermined low price, and the price of this commodity on the open market, constitutes the amount of what is termed a distress sale. The latter is itself influenced by the bargaining capacity (or lack thereof) of the peasant farmer who borrows on the informal market. Also of importance in determining whether or not a cultivator is compelled to resort to the informal credit market - and thus into an interlocked arrangement - is the need for additional liquidity to meet production costs and/or household consumption, as well as the monopsony nature of the paddy market. Data from Kalahandi district in Orissa suggest that access to formal credit is limited in rural areas although there exists a high demand for it, that a high degree of credit rationing by the formal lender occurs, and that poor implementation by the state of minimum support price policy all contribute to the need for informal loans and its attendant interlinkage.