A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions

被引：12
|
作者：
Ozyurt, Selcuk [2 ]
Sanver, M. Remzi [1 ]
机构：
[1] Istanbul Bilgi Univ, Dept Econ, TR-34387 Istanbul, Turkey
[2] NYU, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10012 USA
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 2009年 / 66卷 / 02期
关键词：
Strategy-proofness; Manipulation; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; Social choice correspondences; Hyperfunctions; MANIPULATION; CORRESPONDENCES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.026
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
A social choice hyperfunction picks a non-empty set of alternatives at each admissible preference profile over sets of alternatives. We analyze the manipulability of social choice hyperfunctions. We identify a domain D-lambda of lexicographic orderings which exhibits an impossibility of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite type. Moreover, this impossibility is inherited by all well-known superdomains of D-lambda. As most of the standard extension axioms induce superdomains of D-lambda while social choice correspondences are particular social choice hyperfunctions, we are able to generalize many impossibility results in the literature. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页码：880 / 892
页数：13
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