A Simple Bargaining Procedure for the Myerson Value

被引：3

作者：

Navarro, Noemi ^{[1
]}

Perea, Andres ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Sherbrooke, Dept Econ, Quebec City, PQ, Canada

[2] Maastricht Univ, Dept Quantitat Econ, Maastricht, Netherlands

来源：

B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 2013年 / 13卷 / 01期

关键词：

Myerson value; networks; bargaining; cooperation; LINK FORMATION; SURPLUS; GAMES; IMPLEMENTATION; NETWORKS; MODEL;

D O I：

10.1515/bejte-2012-0006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider situations where the cooperation and negotiation possibilities between pairs of agents are given by an undirected graph. Every connected component of agents has a value, which is the total surplus the agents can generate by working together. We present a simple, sequential, bilateral bargaining procedure, in which at every stage the two agents in a link, (i,j) bargain about their share from cooperation in the connected component they are part of. We show that this procedure yields the Myerson value (Myerson, 1997) if the marginal value of any link in a connected component is increasing in the number of links in that connected component.

引用

页码：131 / 150

页数：20

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