Commitment in First-Price Auctions

被引:1
|
作者
Xu, Yunjian [1 ]
Ligett, Katrina [2 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Singapore Univ Technol & Design, Engn Syst & Design, Singapore, Singapore
[2] CALTECH, Comp & Math Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
[3] CALTECH, Div Humanities & Social Sci, Pasadena, CA 91125 USA
来源
关键词
D O I
10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_23
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
引用
收藏
页码:299 / 299
页数:1
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