The emergence and outcomes of collective action: An institutional and ecosystem approach

被引:17
|
作者
Futemma, C
De Castro, F
Silva-Forsberg, MC
Ostrom, E [1 ]
机构
[1] Indiana Univ, Ctr Study Inst Populat & Environm Change, Bloomington, IN 47408 USA
[2] Univ Sao Paulo, Programa Pos Grad Ciencia Ambiental, Sao Paulo, Brazil
[3] Univ Estadual Campinas, Nucleo Estudos & Pesquisas Ambientais, Campinas, Brazil
[4] Ctr Sustainable Dev Studies, Sch Fields Studies, Atenas, Alajuela, Costa Rica
关键词
collective action; common-pool resource; ecosystem; floodplain; forest use; heterogeneity; Lower Amazon; property rights; social capital; upland;
D O I
10.1080/08941920290069146
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
Participation in collective action is frequently studied through a community-based analysis, with focus on the social features of the participants and on the ecological features of the managed system. This study addresses the importance of scaling down to household level to understand different individual incentives to collaborate (or not) as well as scaling up to the landscape level to evaluate the ecological outcome of the local forms of collective action. We report on a study of a riparian community of 33 households in the Lower Amazon located between two distinct ecosystems-a privately owned upland forest and a communally owned floodplain. Household-based analysis uncovers how heterogeneity within the community leads to different incentives for participation in the communal floodplain, while systemic analysis reveals that interconnection between the managed ecosystem and adjacent ecosystem influences the decisions to participate as well as the ecological outcomes of the collective actions.
引用
收藏
页码:503 / 522
页数:20
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