The philosophical perspectivism well applies as Friedrich Nietzsche's most important philosophical innovation in its already generalized form. In that form of the perspectivism, which we look for reconstructing in this attempt, the most original achievements of Nietzsche's thought can find their place. The perspectivism is in its as authentic form no starting point, rather the end result, in which, directly or contextually, numerous other philosophical innovation can rise. These anticipations cast also their shadow on the problematic of whether the perspectivism (in Nietzsche's sense) is now a relativism (let alone a radical relativism) or perhaps a kind of its opposite, for the pure fact that the multiperspectivism in general contains a relativistic velleity (especially and undoubtedly in comparison with any monoperspectivism), while precisely the indicated anticipations would just work towards the opposite direction (no single perspective is in itself relativistic). The sociological perspectivism (wissenssoziologisch) takes the existential positions motivated by sociological position as starting point and deploys the totality of the own perspectives on this basis, while the epistemological perspectivism must comply, in its individual perspectives, with the legitimate expectations of the epistemology. This insight into the historical process of the philosophy goes however also, under another aspect, together with an unexpected understanding. Nietzsche comes, with a total conscience, to the elaboration of the epistemological perspectivism. His real objective was in the epistemology, methodology or theory of science itself! Nietzsche's breakthrough in the field of the perspectivism was directly oriented toward the change of the philosophical perspective itself! He wanted to free himself from the chains of the monoperspectivistic view.