HUMAN DIGNITY IN ADAM SMITH: THE RECONCILIATION BETWEEN LIBERALISM AND MORAL

The mainstream view of the twentieth century suggests that the Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith made a tout court defense of individualism and the pure rational calculation of economics. However, we consider this to be a biased interpretation that ignores an integrated reading of his books, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and Wealth of Nations (1776), which hinder a global view of his thinking. In opposition to this dominant view, we propose, as the central objective of this article, the conciliation between Smith's classical liberalism and his sentimental ethics, based on the notion of human dignity, present in the recognition of the other as an equal. If this hypothesis is confirmed, we will defend the thesis of sympathetic liberalism in Adam Smith's philosophical system. For this, we will analyze the feeling of Smithian sympathy and its interference in interpersonal relationships, then, the device of moral justification of impartiality as a promoter of fairness behavior. Finally, we will argue that the intertwining of these two elements of Smithian sentimental ethics in public space engenders a notion of human dignity compatible with his liberalism, insofar as it respects individual freedoms while fostering the progress of commercial societies. For such, we will make use of the work Theory of Moral Sentimentalism by Adam Smith and the article Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith by Stephen Darwall.