Moral Judgments and Intuitions About Freedom

被引：40

作者：

Phillips, Jonathan ^{[1
]}

Knobe, Joshua ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ N Carolina, Dept Philosophy, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA

来源：

关键词：

MIND;

D O I：

10.1080/10478400902744279

中图分类号：

B84 [心理学];

学科分类号：

04 ; 0402 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：30 / 36

页数：7

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