Firm reputation and incentives to "milk" pending patents

被引：3
|
作者：
Koenen, Johannes [1 ]
Peitz, Martin [2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Munich, Ifo Inst Leibniz Inst Econ Res, D-81679 Munich, Germany
[2] Univ Mannheim, Dept Econ, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
[3] CEPR, Washington, DC USA
[4] CERRE, Brussels, Belgium
[5] CESifo, Munich, Germany
[6] MaCCI, Mannheim, Germany
[7] ZEW, Mannheim, Germany
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2015年 / 43卷
关键词：
Pending patents; Reputation; Patent quality; Patent office policy; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; MARKET; INFORMATION; LITIGATION; SETTLEMENT; QUALITY;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.08.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In whenever a truly patentable idea has been generated. Firms have a short-run incentive to deviate and receive additional rents from unworthy pending patents, as well as potential rents from PTO mistakes in granting patents. We provide conditions for reputation to be preserved in equilibrium and analyze which market environments are favorable for such an equilibrium to exist. In particular, we analyze the merits of different patent systems. (C) 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V.
引用
收藏
页码：18 / 29
页数：12
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