Loyalty discounts and price-cost tests

被引：6
|
作者：
Calzolari, Giacomo [1 ,2 ]
Denicolo, Vincenzo [3 ,4 ]
机构：
[1] European Univ Inst, Via Fontanelle 18, I-50014 Fiesole, Italy
[2] CEPR, Dept Econ, Via Fontanelle 18, I-50014 Fiesole, Italy
[3] Univ Bologna, Piazza Scaravilli 2, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
[4] CEPR, Dept Econ, Piazza Scaravilli 2, I-40126 Bologna, Italy
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 2020年 / 73卷
关键词：
Loyalty discounts; As-efficient competitor; Price-cost test; Contestable share; Discount-attribution test; MARKET-SHARE CONTRACTS; EXCLUSION; CAPACITY; BARRIER;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102589
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We analyze, by means of a formal economic model, the use of the discount-attribution test to assess the competitive effects of loyalty discounts. (The discount-attribution test is a variant of the price-cost test, where the discount is attributed only to the share of total demand that is regarded as effectively contestable.) In the model, a dominant firm enjoys a competitive advantage over its rivals and uses market-share discounts to boost the demand for its own products. In this framework, we show that the attribution test is misleading or, at best, completely uninformative. Our results cast doubts on the applicability of price-cost tests to loyalty discount cases. (c) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页数：14
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