Customer Oriented Electric Vehicle Charging Scheduling In Day-ahead Market Via Aggregative Game Model

The use of electric vehicles (EVs) are increasing in the transportation world. In the electricity market, if a large number of EVs are connected in the power system, but the EVs charging power demand is scheduled appropriately, then the EV owners, as well as the grid, will make the profit. This work focuses on customer-oriented EV charging in the day-ahead market with the objective of reducing the charging cost for EV owners while also considering the impact on spot prices of EV demand in the day-ahead market. An aggregative game has been proposed for satisfying the EVs charging demand in the day-ahead electricity market. In the day-ahead aggregative game approach, we formulate the energy charging problem where each EV chooses its own demand strategy to maximize its own benefit selfishly while taking into account the strategies of other EVs. The Nash equilibrium(NE) for the proposed game model has been proved.