Objectification and its relation to Kant's moral philosophy

Within the context of bioethics, feminism and animal ethics the notion of 'objectification' is used pejoratively to express a morally impermissible action. Objectification is roughly defined as treating a human being or another animal as a thing. Concerning contemporary theories on objectification, it is remarkable that explanatory approaches refer prominently to Kant's ethic, especially to the second formula of the Categorical Imperative (Formula of Humanity, FUL). It states: 'So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means' (GMS, IV: 429). The aim of this paper is to examine how objectification can be considered in a Kantian moral framework in general and how it can be based on the FUL in particular. It will be argued that although there are overlaps between contemporary concepts of objectification and Kantian ethics, they differ in various aspects, especially concerning objectification of animals. This concerns first of all the fact, that Kant didn't use the term 'objectification' (Verdinglichung) at all. Secondly FUL can only be applied to persons, i.e. morally autonomous beings. Against the concept of objectification of many contemporary scholars, according to Kant's moral philosophy objectification of animals is not possible. Therefore FUL is smaller concerning the scope of morally relevant entities. At the same time FUL is wider regarding objectifying actions, including various forms of (self-) objectification, like gluttony, drunkness and suicide, that are not normally part of contemporary debates on objectification.