Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium

被引：13
|
作者：
Fudenberg, Drew [1 ]
Kamada, Yuichiro [2 ]
机构：
[1] Harvard Univ, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
来源：
THEORETICAL ECONOMICS | 2015年 / 10卷 / 03期
关键词：
Rationalizability; common knowledge; extensive-form games; self-confirming equilibrium; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; GAMES; INDUCTION; INFORMATION;
D O I：
10.3982/TE1362
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady-state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.
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页码：775 / 806
页数：32
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