Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium (RPCE) describes the steady-state outcomes of rational learning in extensive-form games when rationality is common knowledge and players observe a partition of the terminal nodes. RPCE allows players to make inferences about unobserved play by others. We discuss the implications of this using numerous examples, and discuss the relationship of RPCE to other solution concepts in the literature.
机构:
Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Sch Business Adm, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
Hebrew Univ Jerusalem, Ctr Study Rational, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
Microsoft Israel R & D Ctr, IL-91905 Jerusalem, IsraelHebrew Univ Jerusalem, Sch Business Adm, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
Feldman, Michal
Tennenholtz, Moshe
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机构:
Microsoft Israel R & D Ctr, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
Technion, IL-91905 Jerusalem, IsraelHebrew Univ Jerusalem, Sch Business Adm, IL-91905 Jerusalem, Israel
Tennenholtz, Moshe
ALGORITHMIC GAME THEORY, PROCEEDINGS,
2009,
5814
: 48
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