Truth: the Aim and Norm of Belief

被引：0
|
作者：
Whiting, Daniel [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Southampton, Fac Humanities, Southampton SO17 1BJ, Hants, England
来源：
TEOREMA | 2013年 / 32卷 / 03期
关键词：
Belief; Truth; Normativity; Evidence; Moorean Beliefs; Aim of Belief;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号：
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要：
Belief is subject to a norm according to which one may believe a proposition if and only if it is true. After explaining how this view relates to the view that belief aims only at the truth, I defend my formulation of the norm of truth against a number of objections. A recurring issue which several of those objections raise is whether the proper formulation of the norm which governs believing should include the claim that, if a proposition is true, one ought to believe it. I argue that it should not.
引用
收藏
页码：121 / 135
页数：15
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