Central Bank Transparency and Independence: Updates and New Measures

被引:0
|
作者
Dincer, N. Nergiz [1 ]
Eichengreen, Barry [2 ]
机构
[1] TED Univ, Ankara, Turkey
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
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中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper reports updated measures of transparency and independence for more than 100 central banks. The indices show that there has been steady movement in the direction of greater transparency and independence over time. In addition, we show that outcomes such as the variability of inflation are significantly affected by both central bank transparency and independence. Disentangling the impact of the two dimensions of central bank arrangements remains difficult, however.
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页码:189 / 253
页数:65
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