Contests with interdependent preferences

被引：5
|
作者：
Shaffer, Sherrill [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Wyoming, Dept Econ & Finance, Laramie, WY 82071 USA
来源：
APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2006年 / 13卷 / 13期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1080/13504850500425477
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Relaxing the common assumption of purely self-interested preferences in contests, it is shown that altruism (bilateral or unilateral) reduces equilibrium rent-seeking effort. The effects on net payoffs are more complex. Strategic interdependence is possible, but the symmetric equilibrium is pure self-interest.
引用
收藏
页码：877 / 880
页数：4
相关论文
共 50 条
12345