Resource Rent in Individual Quota Fisheries

被引：51
|
作者：
Asche, Frank [1 ]
Bjorndal, Trond [2 ]
Gordon, Daniel V. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Stavanger, Stavanger, Norway
[2] Univ Portsmouth, CEMARE, Portsmouth PO1 2UP, Hants, England
[3] Univ Calgary, Dept Econ, Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada
来源：
LAND ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 85卷 / 02期
关键词：
TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS; PROFIT FUNCTION; INDUSTRY; AGGREGATION; EFFICIENCY; PROPERTY; MARKET;
D O I：
10.3368/le.85.2.279
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Traditional fisheries management schemes generate incentives for vessels to maximize catch, resulting in rent dissipation and overcapacity. individual vessel quota management schemes change the incentives to maximize profit and have the potential to generate resource rent and reduce capacity. An interesting question is whether it is the changed incentives due to individual quota or the capacity reduction due to transferability of individual quota that is most important in generating rent. In this study, a cost function approach is used to model and measure rent generated and potential rent in a fishery managed with individual vessel quotas. (JEL C30, Q22)
引用
收藏
页码：279 / 291
页数：13
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