Ontology and Terminology in Sartre's Being and Nothingness Part II. Being, Existence, Negation

Sartre's "phenomenological ontology" is considered in the aspect of the introducing and functioning of the main terms, through which his ambiguous concept is formed. Two main differences form two basic presuppositions of my research: the difference and interconnection of terms, concepts and problems, and the difference between analysis and interpretation. The second part of the article analyzes the way of introduction of the terms "phenomenon of being" and "being a phenomenon". The relevance of the concepts of transphenomenality of being and non-being in phenomenological ontology are called in question. Sartre's "ontological proof" is critically analyzed; the reasoning that could lead Sartre to the understanding of consciousness as emptiness and nonobjectivity, as well as to the convergence of the concepts of consciousness and nothing, is being reconstructed. Sartre manages to define the contours of the real problem: the relationship between question and negation, but the question of the origin of negation was reduced to the question of the origin of semi-mythical nothingness. Analyzing Sartre's concept of anxiety and freedom, the author expresses doubts about the justification of applying the concepts of being and nothing to the analysis of such problems.