Game-theoretic models of tender design

被引：2
|
作者：
Mazalov, V. V. [1 ]
Tokareva, J. S. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Russian Acad Sci, Inst Appl Math Res, Karelian Res Ctr, Petrozavodsk, Russia
[2] Zabaikalsky State Univ, Chita, Russia
来源：
AUTOMATION AND REMOTE CONTROL | 2014年 / 75卷 / 10期
基金：
俄罗斯基础研究基金会;
关键词：
Remote Control; Voronoi Diagram; Bargaining Model; Tender Model; Execution Period;
D O I：
10.1134/S0005117914100117
中图分类号：
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号：
0812 ;
摘要：
This paper considers an n-player non-zero-sum game arising in tender design. Players submit some projects characterized by a vector of certain parameters. An arbitrator or arbitration committee chooses one of the projects by a stochastic procedure; its probability distribution function appears known to all players. The winner gains a payoff depending on the parameters of his project. The authors develop the game-theoretic model of this problem.
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页码：1848 / 1860
页数：13
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