The principal-agent problem, tracking error, and the optimal investment portfolio

被引:0
|
作者
Boynton, Wentworth [1 ]
Blosick, Gregory [1 ]
Rainish, Robert F. [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ New Haven, Dept Finance, West Haven, CT 06516 USA
关键词
G12; G1l; principal-agent problem; Fama and French assets; tracking error; RETURNS;
D O I
10.1080/13504851.2014.934429
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The principal seeks a portfolio manager to manage funds. The principal uses a tracking-error constraint that restricts the portfolio's volatility. Without the constraint, the manager may increase the portfolio return by adding high-variance assets. Tests assume that the benchmark is the value-weighted market portfolio less the risk-free rate (MKT). Tests then add the Fama and French four long-short portfolios to test if they can increase return without a large increase in the portfolio variance. SMB (Small Minus Big) is long in small stocks and short in big stocks and picks up the small-firm premium. HML (High Minus Low) is long in high book-to-market stocks and short in low book-to-market stocks and picks up the value premium. WML (Winners Minus Losers) is long in past winners and short in past losers and picks up the momentum premium. Tests find that SMB adds tracking error and small returns, HML adds tracking error and large returns, and WML adds modest tracking error and large returns. WML requires heavy trading. Net of trade costs, the WML gain disappears. However, the trade execution costs to hold HML are modest. Net of trade costs, we see a gain from adding HML to MKT.
引用
收藏
页码:239 / 246
页数:8
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [41] The principal-agent model in venture investment based on fairness preference
    Xu, Dongsheng
    Liu, Qingqing
    Jiang, Xin
    AIMS MATHEMATICS, 2021, 6 (03): : 2171 - 2195
  • [42] Robust reinsurance and investment strategies under principal-agent framework
    Wang, Ning
    Siu, Tak Kuen
    Fan, Kun
    ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2024, 336 (1-2) : 981 - 1011
  • [43] Optimal retail lease contracts: The principal-agent approach
    Lee, K
    REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS, 1995, 25 (06) : 727 - 738
  • [44] Optimal Contract for the Principal-Agent Under Knightian Uncertainty
    Wang, Kun-Lun
    Fei, Chen
    Fei, Wei-Yin
    JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONS RESEARCH SOCIETY OF CHINA, 2020, 8 (04) : 637 - 654
  • [45] OPTIMAL LIQUIDATION RULE AND DEBT IN THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
    CHANG, C
    WANG, Y
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1992, 40 (01) : 23 - 26
  • [46] Optimal Contract for the Principal-Agent Under Knightian Uncertainty
    Kun-Lun Wang
    Chen Fei
    Wei-Yin Fei
    Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2020, 8 : 637 - 654
  • [47] π/4 -: The optimal covenant angle under principal-agent
    Yin, HY
    Xia, XP
    Pan, HP
    PROCEEDINGS OF 2003 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MANAGEMENT SCIENCE & ENGINEERING, VOLS I AND II, 2003, : 1847 - 1851
  • [48] Principal-agent relationship between urban and rural infrastructure investment
    Song, Jianhua
    JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY MATHEMATICS, 2018, 21 (04) : 929 - 939
  • [49] A venture investment principal-agent model base on game theory
    Zhang Xu-Bo
    Zhang Zi-Gang
    2007 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTOMATION AND LOGISTICS, VOLS 1-6, 2007, : 1028 - +
  • [50] A continuous-time version of the principal-agent problem
    Sannikov, Yuliy
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2008, 75 (03): : 957 - 984