Fair and unfair punishers coexist in the Ultimatum Game

被引:58
|
作者
Branas-Garza, Pablo [1 ]
Espin, Antonio M. [2 ]
Exadaktylos, Filippos [3 ]
Herrmann, Benedikt [4 ]
机构
[1] Middlesex Univ London, Sch Business, London NW4 4BT, England
[2] Univ Granada, GLOBE, Dept Teor & Hist Econ, E-18071 Granada, Spain
[3] Istanbul Bilgi Univ, BELIS, Murat Sertel Ctr Adv Econ Studies, TR-34060 Eyup Istanbul, Turkey
[4] Univ Nottingham, Sch Econ, Nottingham NG7 2RD, England
来源
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 2014年 / 4卷
关键词
ANTISOCIAL PUNISHMENT; ALTRUISTIC PUNISHMENT; COSTLY PUNISHMENT; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; SEROTONIN; RETALIATION; SIDE;
D O I
10.1038/srep06025
中图分类号
O [数理科学和化学]; P [天文学、地球科学]; Q [生物科学]; N [自然科学总论];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
In the Ultimatum Game, a proposer suggests how to split a sum of money with a responder. If the responder rejects the proposal, both players get nothing. Rejection of unfair offers is regarded as a form of punishment implemented by fair-minded individuals, who are willing to impose the cooperation norm at a personal cost. However, recent research using other experimental frameworks has observed non-negligible levels of antisocial punishment by competitive, spiteful individuals, which can eventually undermine cooperation. Using two large-scale experiments, this note explores the nature of Ultimatum Game punishers by analyzing their behavior in a Dictator Game. In both studies, the coexistence of two entirely different sub-populations is confirmed: prosocial punishers on the one hand, who behave fairly as dictators, and spiteful (antisocial) punishers on the other, who are totally unfair. The finding has important implications regarding the evolution of cooperation and the behavioral underpinnings of stable social systems.
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页数:4
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