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On the optimality of not allocating
被引:2
|作者:
Hernando-Veciana, Angel
[1
]
Michelucci, Fabio
[2
]
机构:
[1] Univ Carlos III Madrid, Dept Econ, E-28903 Getafe, Madrid, Spain
[2] CERGE EI, Prague 11121 1, Czech Republic
关键词:
Efficiency;
Auctions;
Mechanism design;
D O I:
10.1016/j.econlet.2014.09.016
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:233 / 235
页数:3
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