Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies

被引：6

作者：

Barreda-Tarrazona, Ivan ^{[1
,2
]}

Georgantzis, Nikolaos ^{[1
,2
,3
]}

Manasakis, Constantine ^{[4
,5
,6
]}

Mitrokostas, Evangelos ^{[7
]}

Petrakis, Emmanuel ^{[8
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Jaume 1, LEE, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain

[2] Univ Jaume 1, Dept Econ, Castellon de La Plana 12071, Spain

[3] Univ Reading, Sch Agr Policy & Dev, Reading RG6 2AH, Berks, England

[4] Univ Crete, Dept Polit Sci, Gallos, Germany

[5] Fdn Res & Technol Hellas, Inst Appl & Computat Math, Iraklio, Germany

[6] Univ Dusseldorf, Dusseldorf Inst Competit Econ, Dusseldorf, Germany

[7] Univ Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business Sch, Econ & Finance Subject Grp, Richmond Bldg,Portland St, Portsmouth PO1 3DE, Hants, England

[8] Univ Dusseldorf, Dusseldorf Inst Competit Econ, Dusseldorf, Germany

来源：

ECONOMIC MODELLING | 2016年 / 54卷

关键词：

Experimental economics; Oligopoly theory; Managerial delegation; Endogenous contracts; RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION; STRATEGIC DELEGATION; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; INCENTIVES; COMPETITION; MANAGEMENT; CHOICE; FIRMS; PRICE; PAY;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econmod.2015.12.028

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Given the ongoing debate on managerial compensation schemes, our paper offers empirical insights on the strategic choice of firms' owners over the terms of a managerial compensation contract, as a commitment device aiming at gaining competitive advantage in the product market. In a quantity setting duopoly we experimentally test whether firms' owners compensate their managers through contracts combining own profits either with revenues or with relative performance, and the resulting managerial behaviour in the product market. Prominent among our results is that firms' owners choose relative performance over profit revenue contracts more frequently. Further, firms' owners successfully induce a more aggressive behaviour by their managers in the market, by setting incentives which deviate from strict profit maximization. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：205 / 217

页数：13

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